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The  feed  grain  program  probably  has  the  strongest  claim  to
success  of  the major  farm  programs  of  the present  administration.
The  program  has  been  somewhat  expensive.  But  it  is  showing
results:  Corn  Belt  farm income  has  been  maintained;  excess  stocks
of  feed  grains  have  been  reduced;  consumer  food  costs  have  not
risen significantly  in the  livestock,  poultry,  dairy area;  and  no  sub-
sidy has been required  to move  corn in the export field.
Nevertheless,  feed  grain  stocks  still  remain  excessive,  and  a
further reduction  in stocks  is  necessary.
The  feed  grain  problem  stems  from  the  fact  that  output  of
feed  grain  per  acre  has  risen  faster  than  demand.  Also,  output  of
feed  grains  per man  has  risen faster  than demand.  This  rising out-
put  is  the  result  of  improved  seed,  increased  use  of  fertilizer,  in-
secticides,  labor  saving  machinery,  and  denser  planting.  Finally,
all  these forces  have interacted  to  give  an  additional upward  push
to  output.
From 1952 to 1960, the problem  of output expanding faster than
demand was  met by moving  the  excess production  into government
hands.  Carryover stocks quadrupled  in the eight years between  1952
and  1960.  Stocks increased  from  about 20  to about  85  million  tons
in  round  figures  during  this  period.  During  the  last  two  years  of
this  period,  1959  and  1960,  the  annual  rate  of  expansion  was  be-
tween  8 and  10 million  tons  per year.
The adjustment  choice  was expanding  demand or  reducing pro-
duction.  In  either  case  the  job  was  to  bring  output  and  effective
demand into line. An additional problem was  reducing burdensome
and costly excess  stocks  which were costing roughly about  18  cents
per bushel per year for corn.
One  way  to reduce  stocks  is  to  produce  less  than  is used-then
to  make  up  the  difference  from  the  sale  of  government-owned
carryover  stocks.  The  only  other  choice  is  just  to  destroy  these
stocks.  Once  the  stocks  are  reduced,  production  can  be  expanded
to  equal  current  demand.  The  feed  grain  problem  is  comparable
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the  industry  has  plant  overcapacity,  the  solution  is  mainly  one  of
closing  plants.  But  if  the  stocks  are  excessive  due  to  short-term
inventory  fluctuation,  then  plants  can  be  shut  down  temporarily
or  operated  at  less  than  capacity  during  a  temporary  period  until
inventories  are brought  more  nearly in line.
Feed  grain  problems  differ  from  wheat,  cotton,  and  tobacco
problems  in some  basic  respects.  With wheat,  cotton,  and  tobacco,
all farmers are  surplus producers.  But in feed  grains,  some  farmers
and also some areas are deficit producers. Therefore,  producers  have
differing  attitudes  depending  upon  whether  they  are  in  a  deficit
or surplus  producing  situation.  Because feed  grains  are  not  strictly
a  cash  crop,  some  look  on  feed  grains  as  a  cost while  others  look
on them  as  a source  of income.
The  excessive  carryover  stocks  of feed  grains  in early  1961  had
reached  the  stage  where  Congress  became  concerned  about  the
situation  and  passed  the  1961  feed  grain  program.  A  total  of
1,145,974  farms,  or  42 percent  of  all  farms  growing  corn  and  sor-
ghum  grain,  participated  in  the  1961  feed  grain  program.  Farmers
were paid for diverting  a total of 25.2 million  acres  under  the pro-
gram.  In  addition,  28.3  million  acres  still  were  retired  under  the
Conservation  Reserve.  Some  of  these acres  had  been  in feed  grain
prior to being put under Conservation  Reserve.  The  1961 feed  grain
program,  as  was  the  case  with  the  Conservation  Reserve  and  the
Acreage  Reserve  under  the  Soil  Bank  Programs  of the  1950's,  paid
for  more  acreage  reduction  than  the  actual  acreage  reduced.  The
reason  for this is:  At  any particular  time,  some farmers  are  expand-
ing crop acreage.  These farmers are likely to stay out of the program
and proceed with their acreage  expansion.  At the same  time, others
are contracting  acreage.  Such farmers  are inclined  to go along with
the program,  particularly when  they  are  going to be  paid  for what
they had intended  to do  anyway.  The farmers  who  stay  out of  the
program  and  increase  their acreage-partially  offsetting  the  reduc-
tion  made  by  those  who  participate-are  the  ones  who  cause  the
slippage.
On many farms, the  1961 feed grain program  combined with the
higher  soybean  price  support  operated  to  reduce  corn  and  oat
acreage  and to  increase  soybean planting.  Thus,  the program  actu-
ally  also  reduced  oat  acreage  even  though  oats  were  not  directly
under  contol.  The 1961  harvested  oat acreage  was  1.3  million acres
less  than  in  1960.
The  1961  feed  grain  production  totaled  140.6  million  tons-14
million  tons,  or about  10 percent,  below the record  1960 crop.
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tons,  somewhat  above  the  level  of  the  previous  two  years,  partly
due  to  larger  exports  and  continued  heavy  domestic  use.  About
15  million  tons  of  feed  grain  were  withdrawn  from  carryover  to
meet  the  1961-62  requirements,  reducing  carryover  on  October  1,
1962, to 71.8 million tons.
About  782 million dollars  was  paid  to growers  for  reducing  the
plantings  of corn  and  sorghum  grain.  Administrative  costs  covered
by  direct  congressional  appropriations  amounted  to  an  additional
42  million  dollars.  The  payment  thus  made,  however,  was  a  low
percentage  of the total value  of the feed  grain-livestock  economy.
The  average  price of  corn sold by the Commodity  Credit Corpora-
tion to finance  payments to farmers  was  about $1.02 per bushel ,and
for  sorghum  grain  about  $1.82.  This  differed  little  from  the  price
that prevailed  in the previous year  and,  thus, had little  effect  upon
meat and livestock  prices to the consumer.
To the cost of the 1961 feed grain program should also be added
approximately  475  million  bushels  of  1961  corn  and  105  million
bushels  of sorghum  grain taken  over  in default  of CCC  loans.
The  1962  feed  grain  program  was  essentially  an  extension  of
the  1961  program  except  that  barley  also  was  included.  Farmers
signed up  32.8 million  acres,  but they were  paid for diverting  only
28.2  million  acres  under  the  program.  Actual  participation  at  the
final check  up proved  to be  less than  the  sign  up.  Total feed  grain
production  for  1962  was  estimated  at  143.1  million  tons.  Average
corn yields  set a new  all-time  record.  Preliminary  estimates  by  the
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  of  feed  grain  utilization
during  the  1962-63  feeding  year  were  154.7  million  tons,  which
should  be  about  11.6  million  tons  more  than  produced.  According
to  these  estimates,  the  carryover  stocks  on  October  1,  1963  will
be  about  60 million  tons.
Farmers received a total of about 684 million  dollars in payments
for  corn diversion,  124 million  dollars  for  sorghum  grain  diversion,
and  36 million  dollars  for barley  diversion,  making  a  grand  total
of  844  million  dollars  paid  to  farmers  for  diversion.  In  addition,
administrative  costs  of  29  million  dollars  were  covered  by  direct
appropriation.  Thus,  the  total  cash  expenditures  under  the  1962
feed grain program  came to approximately  873 million dollars.  The
average  price  received by  CCC to pay  these costs  was  about  $1.08
for corn and about $1.81  for sorghum grain. The price was higher in
the  second  half  of  the year partly  due  to  the  drouth  scare  during
the latter part  of  June  1963.  This  produced  a  desire  by feed  users
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part  with  grain.
In  addition,  CCC  is  expected  to  take  over  about  650  million
bushels of 1962  crops of feed grains and to sell them back at a loss.
Such  losses  are  again  expected  to  be  in  the  range  of  100  to  150
million  dollars.
Several  important  changes  were  made  in  the  1963  feed  grain
program. All grain produced by the participants  became  eligible for
price  support.  A  direct payment  based upon  the base  yield  of  the
permitted  planted  acres  was  also  made  to  producers  who  par-
ticipated  in the program.  The  loan  level was  dropped  to  $1.07  per
bushel.
The  1963 program provided greater  economic incentives  in some
cases  than  in  the two  previous  years  to  divert  a  minimum  of  20
percent of the base  acreage.  Thus, more farmers  participated  in the
1963  program  than  in  the  1962  program,  but  fewer  acres  were
diverted  under  the  1963  program.  Therefore,  the  cost  per  acre  of
diversion was  higher  under the  1963 program  than  under the  1961
and  1962  programs.
Current  stocks  of feed  grains  are  still  generally  regarded  to  be
greater than  required  to provide  an adequate  reserve for protection
against adverse weather  and for national defense.  In addition,  most
observers  agree  that feed  grain  production  would  exceed  current
markets  at  recent  prices  of  $1.00  to  $1.10  per  bushel.  Therefore,
feed  grain  policies  over  the  next  few  years  should  be  directed
toward  reducing  feed  grain  stocks  to  desirable  levels  and  then
equating  production  with  demand  at  recent  prices-which  have
been  reasonably  well worked  into  the  cost  structure  of  the  deficit
producers  in the deficit production  areas.
One  of the  important  requirements  for  the future  is the  estab-
lishment  of a  desired  level of  feed  grain  stocks  and  also  a  desired
market  support  level  for feed  grains.  Constant pressure  is exerted
from some sources to increase the loan level for corn prices-without
due  regard  for the fact that as the  price  of a  product  is  increased,
less  of  that  product  will  be  used.  This  is  an  important  cause  for
concern for the future-should the price of corn be raised very  much
to the point where  a subsidy is required,  then the use of feed  grain
by both domestic and foreign  consumers  will begin  to be curtailed.
The  desired  level  of  feed  grain  carryover  stocks  should  be
specified  as  a  range  of  figures rather  than  a  precise  figure.  Precise
results from a feed  grain program  are  difficult  to obtain  in any  one
year  due  to  variations  in  participation  response  and  the  weather.
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stock  level  in  a  single  year  should  not  be  a  signal  for  a  higher
production  that might  overshoot the  market  considerably.  A  range
of  figures  would  permit  reduction  of  stocks  to  the  lower  level  of
the range  without  immediate  action  to  increase  production,  which
would be required  if  a single figure  were  used.
Most of the evidence  based upon  letters  to farm  magazines  and
comments  in meetings over the Midwest indicate that at the present
time,  farmers  are reasonably  well  satisfied except  with  the  general
mechanics  of the feed  grain program.  Therefore,  the  relatively  few
concerns  that  are  expressed  deal  primarily  with  the  mechanics  of
the program rather  than the general policy  direction.
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Improving Policy Education
Programs